Paul Stoffels Returns To Galapagos Cell Therapy Program With Up To $240 Million Armed Deal

Paul Stoffels has found a way back to the cell therapy assets he once made central to Galapagos’ strategy. His new Belgian company, Armed Cell Therapeutics, has agreed to acquire Lakefront Biotherapeutics’ unwanted preclinical cell therapy pipeline in a back-loaded transaction worth just under $240 million in biobucks.

Both BioSpace and Fierce Biotech reported that the package includes about $9 million upfront and up to $230 million in milestone payments. The sale gives a path forward to programs that were left behind after Galapagos, now rebranded as Lakefront Biotherapeutics, abandoned cell therapy and redirected its strategy toward autoimmune T-cell engagers.

The transaction is notable less for its near-term economics than for what it says about asset recycling in biotech. Large strategy pivots can strand programs that no longer fit the acquirer’s priorities even when a previous management team still believes in the science. In this case, the buyer is the former chief executive who built the portfolio in the first place.

The commercial picture

Armed Cell Therapeutics was founded by Stoffels, former Galapagos cell therapy discovery leader John Mellors, and Peter Verhaeghe, a managing partner at Belgian law firm VVGB Advocaten/Avocats, according to BioSpace. Armed’s lead programs will target non-Hodgkin lymphoma and small cell lung cancer, though they remain in preclinical research.

The assets include “multi-targeting and armed CAR-T constructs designed to improve the potency and persistence of CAR-Ts and prevent cancer treatment resistance in hematological and solid tumors of high unmet need,” the companies said in an Oct. 15 release cited by Fierce Biotech.

For Lakefront, the sale closes out a portfolio it had no intention of funding. Fierce reported that Galapagos had tried to interest “all the strategic players” in the cell therapy business, but then-CEO Henry Gosebruch said in November 2025 that none had engaged seriously. That helps explain why the upfront payment is limited while milestones make up most of the headline value: the assets keep optionality for the seller but transfer development risk to a small new company built around them.

The road here

The programs trace back to AboundBio, which Galapagos acquired in 2022 for $14 million, according to Fierce. Under Stoffels, Galapagos had planned to advance three next-generation CAR-T candidates from that platform into the clinic over the following three years.

That strategy unraveled quickly. BioSpace reported that in early 2025 Galapagos planned to split into two businesses, with one housing the cell therapy assets and another using a large cash position to pursue new assets. Stoffels, who had joined in 2022 and promised a five-year turnaround, was ousted in spring 2025 and replaced by Gosebruch, who had been leading the proposed spinout focused on external dealmaking.

By October 2025, the company had exited cell therapy. Fierce said the wind-down was expected to affect about 365 employees across Europe, the U.S. and China, with two U.S. facilities and sites in the Netherlands, Switzerland and China set for closure. The company took a 228 million euro, or $269 million, financial hit from the move. In May 2026, Galapagos rebranded to Lakefront Biotherapeutics.

Its new strategic center came through Ouro Medicines. BioSpace reported that in March, Lakefront and partner Gilead Sciences acquired Ouro Medicines for $2.1 billion, while Fierce reported Gilead bought Ouro outright for $1.67 billion with the expectation that Galapagos would cover half the upfront cost. Both accounts agree that the deal supplied the autoimmune T-cell engager pipeline now defining Lakefront’s direction.

What to watch

Armed now has the chance to test whether these abandoned assets failed strategically at Lakefront or whether they simply no longer fit the company’s capital allocation. Lakefront Chief Business Officer Sooin Kwon said the sale provides “a path to continue to advance these assets on behalf of patients.”

The broader signal is that preclinical programs left for dead inside larger restructurings can still retain value if a focused team is willing to take them on with modest upfront cash and milestone-heavy terms. Stoffels is effectively betting that what was too costly and too noncore for a restructured public biotech can still support a new specialist company.